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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY 
BUSINESS CASE DIVISION 
STATE OF GEORGIA 
DRUMMOND FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC; et ) 
al., ) 
) Civil Action File No. 
Plaintiffs, ) 2014CV253677 
) 
V. ) 
) Bus. Case Div. 4 
TMX FINANCE HOLDINGS, INC.; et al., ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS AND REQUESTS 
The above styled action is before the Court on various pending motions and requests, to wit: 
(1) Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Supplemental Motion to Dismiss (collectively "Motion to 
Dismiss"); (2) Defendant TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. 's1 Motion to Add Parties and for Related Relief 
("Motion to Add Parties"); (3) Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Counts II and lII of Defendants' Amended 
Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim and Motion to Dismiss Counts II and III of Defendants' 
Second Amended Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim (collectively "Motion to Dismiss 
Counterclaim"); (4) various discovery related motions and issues, including Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel 
and Defendants' Motion to Compel; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement of Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) 
of the Interlocutory Injunction; and (6) Plaintiffs' Motion for Separate Trial on Defendants' Permissive 
Counterclaims. Having considered the record, the Court finds and orders as follows: 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
This case concerns a dispute between businesses which compete in the title loan industry. 
Plaintiffs' are companies affiliated by a common ownership and control engaged in the business of 
Hereinafter TitleMax Georgia. 
Plaintiffs include Drummond Financial Services, LLC; Anderson Financial Services, LLC; LoanSmart, 
LLC; Kipling Financial Services, LLC; Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; LoanMax, LLC; Mid-American Title Loans, 
LLC; Fairfax Financial Services, LLC; Wellshire Financial Services, LLC; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc.; 
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making loans to consumers secured by motor vehicles (i.e. "title loans") and consists of loan brokers and 
direct lenders. Plaintiffs Drummond Financial Services, Inc. and LoanSta? act as loan brokers in that 
they assist customers seeking to obtain title loans from third-party lenders. The remaining Plaintiffs are 
direct lenders who specialize in making title loans directly to consumers. Plaintiffs assert they invest 
significant time and resources in developing customer relationships to help ensure customers return for 
future loans. 
The various TitleMax Defendants" are part of a conglomerate of related companies also engaged 
in the title loan business, including brokers and direct lenders. Defendants are direct competitors of 
Plaintiffs and operate stores across the United States. 
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have committed a variety of tortious acts while engaged in a 
nationwide campaign to systematically steal their customers. Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that Defendants: 
(1) improperly accessed Department of Motor Vehicle ("OMV") records in violation of federal and state 
laws to obtain information regarding Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers and then used that 
information to solicit and divert Plaintiffs' customers to the Defendants; (2) improperly entered Plaintiffs' 
premises in order to solicit Plaintiffs' customers; and (3) offered Plaintiffs' employees monetary 
compensation for diverting Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers away from Plaintiffs to 
Defendants. Plaintiffs have asserted six claims against the Defendants including misappropriation of trade 
secrets, unfair competition, two counts of tortious interference with prospective contracts and business 
relationships, trespass and civil conspiracy. 
TitleMax Georgia has asserted a counterclaim against North American Title Loans, LLC, a 
Georgia limited liability company and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc., alleging they are continuously 
Meadowwood Financial Services, LLC; Select Management Funding, LLC; and various North American Title 
Loans, LLC entities registered in Georgia, South Carolina, New Mexico and Utah. Plaintiffs are referred to 
collectively herein as "Plaintiffs" or "Drummond". 
3 "LoanStar" collectively refers to Plaintiffs Wellshire Financial Services LLC and Meadowwood Financial 
Services, LLC. 
4 Defendant TitleMax ("TMX") Finance Holdings, Inc. is the parent company that owns all ownership and 
membership interest in Defendant TMX Finance, Inc. Defendant TMX Finance, Inc. is the parent company that 
owns all ownership and membership interests of all the TMX subsidiaries, including Defendants TMX Ohio, TMX 
Texas, TMX Virginia, TMX Utah, TMX Alabama, TMX New Mexico, TMX Arizona, TMX Missouri, TMX South 
Carolina, and TMX Georgia. Defendants are referred to collectively herein as "Defendants" or TitleMax. 
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violating the Georgia Pawnshop Act, O.C.G.A. §44-12-130 et seq., through their use of the term "loan" in 
their names and advertising. TitleMax Georgia has asserted claims against those entities alleging: 
( l) unfair competition in violation of the Lanham Act; (2) unfair competition in violation of the Uniform 
Deceptive Trade Practices Act; and (3) civil conspiracy. 
Additionally, certain TitleMax Claimants have asserted a counterclaim alleging certain 
Drummond parties' are instructing employees to visit TitleMax stores to falsely claim to be customers 
looking for a title loan or posing as a potential recovery vendor, who then allegedly lie about needing to 
use the restroom in order to gain access to restricted, non-public areas of TitleMax's stores in order to 
photograph its trade secret financial information ( contained on "goal boards"), information which is then 
allegedly shared throughout Drummond's corporate structure. Based on the foregoing, the TitleMax 
Claimants have brought claims alleging: ( l) trespass; (2) misappropriation and theft of trade secrets; 
(3) violation of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; ( 4) conversion (in the 
alternative); (5) civil conspiracy; and (6) entitlement to litigation expenses. 
ANALYSIS 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS I. 
In their Motion to Dismiss, Defendants seek dismissal of Plaintiffs' Count I (misappropriation of 
trade secrets), Count II (unfair competition), Count III (tortious interference with Drummond's 
prospective CSO contracts and business relationships), and Count IV (tortious interference with the Direct 
Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships) under O.C.G.A. §9-11-12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim. Defendants also request dismissal of Count II (unfair competition), Count III 
(tortious interference with Drummond's prospective CSO contracts and business relationships), Count IV 
(tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships), 
Count V (trespass), Count VI (civil conspiracy), and Count IX (temporary restraining order and 
permanent injunction), asserting those counts are "preempted, displaced, or superseded in whole or in part 
by Count I." 
See note 32, infra. 
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A. Standard on a Motion to Dismiss 
A motion to dismiss brought under O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted should not be sustained unless: 
(1) the allegations of the complaint disclose with certainty that the claimant 
would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in 
support thereof; and (2) the movant establishes that the claimant could not 
possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient 
to warrant a grant of the relief sought.... In deciding a motion to dismiss, all 
pleadings are to be construed most favorably to the party who filed them, and 
all doubts regarding such pleadings must be resolved in the filing party's 
favor. 
Austin v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-75, 755 S.E.2d 796, 798-99 (2014) (citing Anderson v. Flake, 267 Ga. 
498, 501(2), 480 S.E.2d 10 (1997)); Abramyan v. State, 301 Ga. 308,309, 800 S.E.2d 366,368 (2017), 
reconsideration denied (June 5, 2017). 
Under the notice pleading procedure of the Georgia Civil Practice Act, only a short and plain 
statement of the claim is required. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-8(a)(2)(A). Nevertheless, "a complaint must give a 
defendant notice of the claim in terms sufficiently clear to enable him to frame a responsive pleading 
thereto." Patrick v. Verizon Directories Corp .. 284 Ga. App. 123, 124 (2007) (quoting Allen v. Bergman, 
201 Ga. App. 781, 783(3)(b)(1991)).6 
B. Whether Plaintiffs state actionable claims with respect to Counts I-IV 
To assess whether Plaintiffs have properly stated claims under Counts I through IV, the Court 
must first determine what substantive law governs and then considers whether Plaintiffs have sufficiently 
stated a claim under the applicable law. 
(1) Misappropriation of trade secrets (Count/) 
Plaintiffs assert their "customer lists and related title loan information" constitute trade secrets 
which Defendants have "acquired or discovered ... by improper and unlawful means."? Specifically, they 
6 With respect to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, the Court has limited its review to the pleadings. See 
Campbell v. Ailion, 338 Ga. App. 382, 384 n. 2, 790 S.E.2d 68, 71 (2016) ("Documents attached to a brief in 
support of [a] motion to dismiss ... cannot be considered in deciding the motion to dismiss") (citation and 
punctuation omitted). 
7 First Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief ("F AC"), ml l 00-101. 
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allege Defendants "performed unlawful and impermissible searches" in order to access drivers' personal 
information from DMV records "in order to target Plaintiffs' customers for direct contact and 
solicitation. "8 
Plaintiffs contend Defendants' conduct violates the trade secret laws of "various States, including 
but not limited to the States of Alabama (Ala Code §8-27-1, et seq.), Utah (Utah Code §13-24-1, et seq.), 
Ohio (Ohio Rev. Code§ 133.61, et seq.), Missouri (Mo. Stat. §417.450 et seq.), Virginia (Va. Code §59.1- 
336, et seq.), New Mexico (N.M. Stat. §57-3A-l), Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Stat. §44-401, et seq.), Tennessee 
(Tenn. Code Ann. §47-25-1701, et seq.), Texas (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §1345A.001, et seq.), 
South Carolina (S.C. Code Ann. §39-8-10, et seq.), and Georgia (O.C.G.A. §10-1-760, et seq.y?" 
However, Plaintiffs only specifically name Ohio, South Carolina, Texas and New Mexico as maintaining 
databases with DMV records which can be sold to certain entities and then resold under limited 
circumstances.l" Insofar as Plaintiffs are not asserting a misappropriation claim with respect to 
Defendants' alleged conduct in Texas or South Carolina, as that conduct is the subject of separate 
litigation/ 1 the Court largely limits it analysis below regarding Plaintiffs' trade secret claims to laws of 
Georgia (to the extent Defendants allege Georgia law governs), Ohio and New Mexico. 
a. Georgia law and conflict of laws analysis 
Plaintiffs fail to state a trade secret claim under Georgia law. To "recover" under the Georgia 
Trade Secrets Act ("TSA"), O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 et seq., a plaintiff must show that it has a trade secret 
as defined by O.C.G.A. §10-1-761(4) and that the defendant misappropriated it. Contract Furniture 
Refinishing & Maint. Corp. of Georgia v. Remanufacturing & Design Grp., LLC, 317 Ga. App. 47, 57, 
730 S.E.2d 708, 715 (2012) (citing Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. of Atlanta v. Holley. 284 Ga. App. 591, 
597(4), 644 S.E.2d 862, 867 (2007)). See O.C.G.A. §10-1-761.12 See also EarthCam, Inc. v. OxBlue 
8 FAC, ,1101. 
FAC, ,1107. 
FAC, ,168. 
FAC, p. 30 n. 2. 
The New Mexico TSA and Ohio TSA, both of which are also modeled after the Uniform Trade Secret Act, 






Corp., 49 F. Supp. 3d 1210, 1225 (N.D. Ga. 2014) ("The plaintiff has the burden of establishing each of 
these statutory elements as to each claimed trade secret. This means that a plaintiff who seeks relief for 
misappropriation of trade secrets must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing that they 
exist").The Georgia TSA defines a "trade secret" as follows: 
"Trade secret" means information, without regard to form, including, but 
not limited to, technical or nontechnical data, a formula, a pattern, a 
compilation, a program, a device, a method, a technique, a drawing, a 
process, financial data, financial plans, product plans, or a list of actual 
or potential customers or suppliers which is not commonly known by or 
available to the public and which information: (A) Derives economic 
value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can 
obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (B) Is the subject 
of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its 
secrecy. 
O.C.G.A. § I 0-1-761 (4). 
However, "[u]nder O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4), only tangible lists of customers and suppliers are 
the property of the [company] and warrant protection as trade secrets." DeGiorgio v. Megabyte Int'l, Inc., 
266 Ga. 539,539,468 S.E.2d 367,369 (1996) (citing Avnet, Inc. v. Wyle Labs., Inc., 263 Ga. 615, 618- 
20(2), 437 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1993)). See also Bacon v. Volvo Serv. Ctr., Inc., 266 Ga. App. 543,545,597 
S.E.2d 440, 443 (2004) (citing Crews v. Roger Wahl, C.P.A., P.C., 238 Ga. App. 892, 898, n. 4, 520 
S.E.2d 727 (1999) ("While a client list may be subject to confidential treatment under the Georgia [TSA], 
the information itself is not inherently confidential. Customers are not trade secrets. Confidentiality is 
afforded only where the customer list is not generally known or ascertainable from other sources and was 
the subject of reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy"). Here, insofar as Plaintiffs do not allege that 
Defendants took a tangible list of their customers, but rather contend Defendants searched motor vehicle 
databases to determine, inter alia, which vehicles have liens held by Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have not stated a 
claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under Georgia law. 13 
13 
(2017). 
See also TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 838, 797 S.E.2d 842, 845 
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Defendants argue that, applying the doctrine of lex loci delicti, Georgia law governs Plaintiffs' 
misappropriation claim related to Defendants' access and use of OMV records in Ohio and New Mexico. 
Defendants contend that since the last event to trigger liability under the Georgia TSA is where Plaintiffs 
sustained their injury and, here, Plaintiffs' economic losses were ultimately suffered in Georgia where 
their principal places of business are located, it follows that Georgia law applies such that Plaintiffs fail to 
state a trade secrets claim regarding Defendants' alleged out-of-state conduct. The Court disagrees. 
Under Georgia law, the lex loci delicti determines the substantive rights 
of the parties. Ohio Southern Express Co. v. Beeler, 110 Ga. App. 867, 
868(1), 140 S.E.2d 235. How do we determine the lex loci delicti where 
the tort is transitory in nature? The general rule is that "the place of 
wrong, the locus delicti, is the place where the injury sustained was 
suffered rather than the place where the act was committed, or, as it is 
sometimes more generally put, it is the place where the last event 
necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." 15A 
C.J.S. Conflict of Laws, § 12(2)(b), 459. Georgia follows the general 
rule: In Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., 133 Ga. App. 378, 210 
S.E.2d 854, we observed that " 'The law of the place where the tort or 
wrong has been committed is the law by which the liability is to be 
determined, and the place of the wrong is the place where ... there takes 
place the last event necessary to make an actor liable for an alleged tort.' 
" Wardell v. Richmond Screw Anchor Co., supra, at p. 380, 210 S.E.2d 
854, quoting Brooks v. Eastern Air Lines, 253 F.Supp. 119, 121 
(N.D.Ga.1966). 
Risdon Enterprises, Inc. v. Colemill Enterprises, Inc., 172 Ga. App. 902, 903-04, 324 S.E.2d 738, 740 
(1984). See Bullard v. MRA Holding, LLC, 292 Ga. 748, 750, 740 S.E.2d 622,625 (2013). 
As noted above, to state a claim under the Georgia TSA (as well as under the New Mexico TSA 
and Ohio TSA), a plaintiff must demonstrate that the information in question constitutes a "trade secret" 
and that the defendant misappropriated it. Notably, however, a plaintiff need not show damages or 
economic injury in order to obtain relief under the Georgia TSA. Indeed, the Act expressly authorizes 
injunctive relief and permits damages "[i]n addition to or in lieu of' such injunctive relief and "if neither 
damages nor unjust enrichment caused by the misappropriation are proved by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the court may award damages caused by misappropriation measured in terms of a reasonable 
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royalty." See O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-762 and 10-1-763.14 Thus, although the Court does not ignore Plaintiffs' 
emphasis throughout their pleadings to having suffered harm in Fulton County, Georgia where they are 
headquartered,15 nevertheless, Defendants' focus on Georgia as the place where Plaintiffs' economic 
injury was ultimately suffered is misplaced with respect to the trade secrets claims.16 
Instead, in analyzing conflict of law issues in trade secret cases, Georgia federal courts have held 
the lex loci delicti is the place where the tortious act of misappropriation and use of the trade secret 
occurred. See, e.g., Manuel v. Convergys Corp., 430 F.3d 1132, 1139-40 (11th Cir. 2005) (where Ohio 
company brought trade secrets claim under Ohio and Georgia law against former employee who 
previously worked for the company in Florida but took a job in Georgia with a competitor and where 
Ohio company alleged it had entrusted former employee with trade secret information that would 
inevitability be used during employment with Georgia competitor, Georgia law governed); Salsbury 
Labs., Inc. v. Merieux Labs., Inc., 735 F. Supp. 1555 (M.D. Ga. 1989), affd as modified, 908 F.2d 706 
(11th Cir. 1990) (Georgia law, rather than Iowa law, applied to poultry vaccine manufacturer's claim for 
misappropriation of trade secrets and confidential information because, although the vaccine allegedly 
misappropriated by competitor was developed in Iowa, misappropriation and use of trade secrets occurred 
at competitor's Georgia laboratory). 
On this issue the Court finds the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws instructive: 
The relative importance of the contacts ... varies somewhat with the nature of the 
tort involved. Thus, the place of injury is of particular importance in the case of 
personal injuries and of injuries to tangible things (see§§ 146- 147). The same is 
true in the case of false imprisonment and of malicious prosecution and abuse of 
process (see § 155). On the other hand, the place of injury is less significant in 
the case of fraudulent misrepresentations (see § 148) and of such unfair 
competition as consists of false advertising and the misappropriation of trade 
values. The injury suffered through false advertising is the loss of customers or of 
trade. Such customers or trade will frequently be lost in two or more states. The 
effect of the loss, which is pecuniary in its nature, will normally be felt most 
severely at the plaintiffs headquarters or principal place of business. But this 
place may have only a slight relationship to the defendant's activities and to the 
14 Similarly, the New Mexico TSA and Ohio TSA authorize both injunctive relief and damages. See N.M. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 57-3A-3, 57-3A-4; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 1333.62, 1333.63. 
15 See, e.g., FAC, iJ,r 5-6, 41, 104, 107, 116, 120, 122, 130, 138, 144, 150. 
16 Here, Plaintiffs seek both injunctive relief and damages. See FAC, ,r,r 104, 107, 151-160. 
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plaintiffs loss of customers or trade. The situation is essentially the same when 
misappropriation of the plaintiffs trade values is involved, except that the 
plaintiff may have suffered no pecuniary loss but the defendant rather may have 
obtained an unfair profit. For all these reasons, the place of injury does not play 
so important a role for choice-of-law purposes in the case of false advertising and 
the misappropriation of trade values as in the case of other kinds of torts. Instead, 
the principal location of the defendant's conduct is the contact that will usually be 
given the greatest weight in determining the state whose local law determines the 
rights and liabilities that arise from false advertising and the misappropriation of 
trade values. 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws§ 145 (1971). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendants' employees unlawfully accessed and used the DMV records of 
Plaintiffs' customers in New Mexico and Ohio to contact them "in order to unlawfully steal" those New 
Mexico and Ohio customers. 17 Thus, the allegedly improper access and misappropriation of customer 
information, if any, occurred in New Mexico and Ohio such that New Mexico and Ohio law, respectively, 
govern Plaintiffs' trade secret claims regarding Defendants' alleged conduct in those states. Further, the 
Court does not find that Georgia's public policy exception requires application of Georgia law. The TSA 
adopted in Georgia, New Mexico and Ohio are each modeled after the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, and 
otherwise have substantially similar definitions of what constitutes a trade secret. 
b. New Mexico TSA and Ohio TSA 
Under the New Mexico TSA, 
[a] "trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, 
program, device, method, technique or process, that: ( 1) derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) is the subject of efforts that are 
reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-3A-2(D). 
Pursuant to the Ohio TSA, 
[a] "trade secret means information, including the whole or any portion or phase 
of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula, 
pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or improvement, or 
any business information or plans, financial information, or listing of names, 
addresses, or telephone numbers, that satisfies both of the following: (1) It 
17 F AC, ml 90-92. 
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derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally 
known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons 
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use. (2) It is the subject of 
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy. 
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§ 1333.61(D). 
Neither state appears to absolutely mandate that a customer list be in tangible form in order to be 
protected under the state's TSA. See Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, 2008-Ohio-292, ~ 24, 117 Ohio 
St. 3d 58, 64, 881 N.E.2d 850, 855; State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 
2000-Ohio-282, 88 Ohio St. 3d 166,172,724 N.E.2d 411,417; Mesarvey, Russell & Co. v. Boyer, No. 
91AP-974, 1992 WL 185656, at *15 (Ohio Ct. App. July 30, 1992), cause dismissed sub nom. Mesarvey, 
Russel & Co. v. Boyer, 65 Ohio St. 3d 1447, 601 N.E.2d 42 (1992); Interstate Serv. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. 
McIntire, No. C-890346, 1991 WL 1386, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 1991); Valeo Cincinnati, Inc. v. 
N&D Machining Serv., Inc, No. 8108537, 1984 WL 7127, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1984), aff'd sub 
nom. Valeo Cincinnati, Inc. v. N & D Machining Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St. 3d 41,492 N.E.2d 814 (1986). 
Rapid Temps, Inc. v. Lamon, 2008-NMCA-122, ~ 23, 144 N.M. 804, 809, 192 P.3d 799,804. 
Both Ohio and New Mexico courts have found that "listings" or "compilations" of customer 
information may be considered trade secrets, even if some of the information is publicly available. See 
State ex rel. Lucas Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. Ohio Envtl. Prot. Agency, 88 Ohio St. 3d 166, 173, 724 
N.E.2d 411, 418 (Ohio 2000); Al Minor & Assoc., Inc. v. Martin, 117 Ohio St. 3d 58, 59, 881 N.E.2d 
850, 851 (Ohio 2008). Compare Berardi's Fresh Roast, Inc. v. PMD Enterprises, Inc., 2008 WL 4681825, 
2008-Ohio-5470, ~ 24 (Ohio 2008). See Rapid Temps, Inc. v. Lamon, 144 N.M. 804, 809, 192 P.3d 799, 
804 (New Mexico 2008). Compare Insure New Mexico, LLC v. McGonigle, 2000-NMCA-018, ~~ 14-15, 
128 N.M. 611, 615-16, 995 P.2d 1053, 1057-58. 
Further, under both New Mexico and Ohio law whether particular information constitutes a trade 
secret is generally a question of fact. See Pincheira v. Allstate Ins. Co., 144 N.M. 601, 609(C)(I), 190 
P.3d 322, 330 (2008) ("The existence of a trade secret ordinarily is a question of fact .. .It is also one of the 
most elusive and difficult concepts in the law to define ... Evaluating trade secret status therefore "requires 
10 
an ad hoc evaluation of all the surrounding circumstances. For this reason, the question of whether certain 
information constitutes a trade secret ordinarily is best resolved by a fact finder after full presentation of 
evidence from each side") (citing Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. PlayWood Toys, Inc .. 342 F.3d 714, 723 
(7th Cir.2003)); Fred Siegel Co., LP.A. v. Arter & Hadden, 85 Ohio St. 3d 171, 181, 707 N.E.2d 853, 
862 (Ohio 1999) ("A possessor of a potential trade secret must take some active steps to maintain its 
secrecy in order to enjoy presumptive trade secret status, and a claimant asserting trade secret status has 
the burden to identify and demonstrate that the material is included in categories of protected information 
under the statute ... The question whether a particular knowledge or process is a trade secret is, however, a 
question of fact to be determined by the trier of fact upon the greater weight of the evidence"). 
Finally, each state defines misappropriation to include the "acquisition of a trade secret of another 
by a person who knows or has reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means." 
See N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-3A-2(B)(l); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1333.6l(B)(l). "Improper means" includes 
theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or 
espionage through electronic or other means. See N.M. Stat. Ann. §57-3A-2(A); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. 
§1333.6l(A). Cf E. I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(taking aerial photography of a competitor's plant construction is an improper means of obtaining 
another's trade secret which may be actionable). 
Here, Plaintiffs allege Defendants unlawfully accessed OMV records to obtain not just 
customers' identities but personal information regarding their customers and their related title loan 
information; information which Plaintiffs allege is not readily available through lawful means and which 
they have expended money, time and effort to maintain confidential and to protect from any unauthorized 
access.18 Given the authorities summarized above, the Court cannot conclude based on the pleadings that 
Defendants have established Plaintiffs "could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of 
the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief' as to their trade secret claims under New Mexico 
18 FAC, ir,i 2, 49-54, 69-77, 79, 86-87, 92, 100-107. 
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and Ohio law. Thus, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs trade secret misappropriation claims 
related to Defendants' alleged conduct in New Mexico and Ohio is DENIED.19 
(2) Preemption of Counts II, Ill, IV, V, VI, and IX 
Defendants urge Plaintiffs' trade secret claims preempt their unfair competition, tortious 
interference, trespass, civil conspiracy and injunctive relief claims to the extent those claims are based on 
alleged trade secret misappropriation. Although Defendants' analysis centers largely on Georgia law and 
the preemption provision contained in the Georgia TSA, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-767,20 as held above, Plaintiffs' 
trade secret claims are governed by the laws of state where the misappropriation occurred. 
The New Mexico TSA does not contain a preemption provision. Thus, there can be no 
preemption with respect to the trade secrets claim asserted under New Mexico law. 
The Ohio TSA "displace[s] conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing 
civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret" but does not affect "[ o ]ther civil remedies that are 
not based on misappropriation of a trade secret." Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333.67. See Glasstech. Inc. v. 
TGL Tempering Sys .• Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999) ("The preemption section of the 
UTSA has been interpreted to bar claims which are based entirely on factual allegations of 
misappropriation of trade secrets"); Kehoe Component Sales Inc. v. Best Lighting Prod .• Inc., 933 F. 
Supp. 2d 974, 1015 (S.D. Ohio 2013) ("Where the common-law claim possesses an independent factual 
basis separate from the factual allegations establishing a UTSA claim, then the portion of the claim 
supported by an independent factual basis survives preemption") (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. 
Goldschmidt. 872 F.Supp.2d 624, 635 (S.D. Ohio 2012). See also Exal Corp. v. Roeslein & Assocs .• Inc., 
19 As noted above, Plaintiffs also allege Defendants' conduct violates the TSA as adopted by Alabama, Utah, 
Missouri, Virginia, Arizona, and Tennessee, although Plaintiffs do not specify how DMV records were accessed or 
used in those states. To the extent Plaintiffs maintain Defendants improperly accessed or used DMV records in those 
states and are asserting a trade secrets claim as to such conduct, that would have to be properly pied and such claims 
would likewise be governed under those states' laws. Whether a trade secrets claim is actionable thereunder (e.g., 
whether the information obtained constitutes a trade secret, what information is/is not is publically available, etc.) is 
better addressed with the benefit of evidence. The Court takes no position on whether Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims 
will ultimately survive summary judgment. 
20 O.C.G.A. §10-l-767(a) states: "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this Code section, this article shall 
supersede conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of 
a trade secret." 
12 
No. 4:12-CV-01830, 2012 WL 4754748, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 2, 2012) ("After full review of the cases, 
this Court finds most persuasive the opinions that require fuller factual development prior to ruling on 
preemption. Acting prematurely can result in a scenario that strips Plaintiffs of any recovery, even though 
they have been wronged").21 
Here, Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims are predicated on allegations their customer list and related 
title loan information constitute trade secrets which Defendants have misappropriated by unlawfully 
searching OMV records in order to contact and solicit Plaintiffs' existing and prospective customers. To 
the extent Plaintiffs' other tort claims are based on improperly obtaining customers' information through 
OMV records in Ohio, those claims would be preempted pursuant to the foregoing authorities. 
Specifically, Count III, tortious interference with Drummond's prospective CSO contracts and business 
relationships, is predicated entirely on the same factual allegations as the trade secrets claims; 
i.e. improperly accessing OMV records to obtain Plaintiffs' customers' information (the alleged trade 
secrets) to solicit their business. As such, under Ohio law, Count III would be preempted by the trade 
secrets claims. 
21 Similarly, the other named states' Trade Secret Acts only preempt common law tort claims to the extent 
they are predicated on or derived from the same factual allegations as the trade secret claim. See Bell Aerospace 
Servs .• Inc. v. U.S. Aero Servs .• Inc., 690 F. Supp. 2d 1267, 1277 (M.D. Ala. 2010) ("[T]he company may not 
pursue both statutory and common law theories of recovery for the ... alleged misappropriation of 'trade secrets' or 
confidential documents" and, thus, "may not pursue its breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim under a theory that is 
essentially the same as its ATSA claim"); Madison Oslin. Inc. v. Interstate Res., Inc., No. 2: 11-CV-0 1343-SLB, 
2012 WL 4730877, at *9 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 30, 2012) ("To the extent plaintiffs plead common law causes of action 
based on the same underlying facts as those giving rise to their claim under the ATSA ... such causes of action are 
preempted"); Unisource Worldwide. Inc. v. Swope, 964 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1056 (D. Ariz. 2013) ("The AUTSA 
expressly preempts all common-law tort claims for misappropriation of a trade secret. A.R.S. § 44-407. It does not 
affect "[ o ]ther civil remedies that are not based on misappropriation of a trade secret") ( citation omitted); Custom 
Hardware Eng'g & Consulting, Inc. v. Dowell, 918 F. Supp. 2d 916,936 (E.D. Mo. 2013) ("Claims based on facts 
related to the misappropriation claim are derivative, and therefore preempted"); ProductiveMD, LLC v. 4UMD, 
LLC, 821 F. Supp. 2d 955,964 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) (citing Hauck Mfg. Co. v. Astec Indus., Inc., 375 F. Supp. 2d 
649,658 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) ("[I]t is clear some of what [the plaintiff] characterizes as breaches of the duty of loyalty 
are preempted by the TUTSA. Under the "same proof test, a claim is preempted "when it necessarily rises or falls 
based on whether the defendant is found to have 'misappropriated' a 'trade secret'"); CDC Restoration & Const., LC 
v. Tradesmen Contractors, LLC, 2012 UT App 60, ~ 48,274 P.3d 317,331 ("[I]fproofofa non-UTSA claim would 
also simultaneously establish a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets, it is preempted irrespective o[f] whatever 
surplus elements of proof were necessary to establish it. .. However, to whatever extent that a claim is based upon 
wrongful conduct independent of the misappropriation of trade secrets or otherwise confidential information, it is 
not preempted" (citation and punctuation omitted); MicroStrategy Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 1363 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) ("[T]he Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act (VUTSA), Va.Code e 59.1-341(A), preempts claims 
predicated on a misappropriation of trade secrets"). See also Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §7(b) ("This Act does not 
affect: ... (2) other civil remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret"). 
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However, the unfair competition, tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' 
prospective contracts and business relationships, trespass, civil conspiracy and injunctive relief claims are 
all predicated on additional factual allegations of misconduct; e.g., trespassing on Plaintiffs' premises to 
confront and solicit their customers and soliciting Plaintiffs' employees to provide referrals of Plaintiffs 
customers in exchange for personal financial incentives.22 Given this, the Court cannot say based on the 
pleadings that the foregoing claims are all preempted in their entirety such that they are subject to 
dismissal in toto. Accordingly, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
IN PART as outlined above. 
(3) Unfair competition (Count JI) 
With respect to Count 11, unfair competition, Plaintiffs allege Defendants have: "surreptitiously'' 
recorded customers' license plate and VIN numbers to search DMV records and then searched DMV 
records by lienholder for Plaintiffs' customers; trespassed onto Plaintiffs' properties in (at least) New 
Mexico, Utah, Alabama, Virginia, Arizona and Georgia to solicit Plaintiffs' customers, including directly 
confronting customers as well as leaving flyers offering cash and other financial incentives to induce 
them to change companies; and solicited Plaintiffs' employees in New Mexico, Alabama, Missouri, 
Arizona, Tennessee, and Georgia, offering them cash to divert Plaintiffs' current and prospective 
customers from Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs allege Defendants' conduct violates statutes regarding 
unfair competition in Utah, Ohio, New Mexico, and South Carolina and violates the common law of 
Utah, Ohio, New Mexico, South Carolina, Missouri, Texas, Arizona and Tennessee. 
Defendants urge Count II should be dismissed to the extent Plaintiffs seek to assert a claim under 
South Carolina's Unfair Trade Practice Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 39-5-10 et seq. ("SCUPTA") and to the 
extent they assert a common law claim for unfair competition. 
a. Unfair competition claim asserted under SCUPTA 
SCUTPA broadly prohibits"[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." S.C. Code Ann. § 39-5-20. To state a SCUTPA 
22 FAC, iM[ll0-111, I 19, 125-127, 132-135, 140, 154-155. 
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claim, the plaintiff must allege "( 1) that the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice, (2) that the 
plaintiff suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant's use of the unlawful trade 
practice, and (3) that the unlawful trade practice engaged in by the defendant had an adverse impact on 
the public interest." Havird Oil Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 149 F.3d 283, 291 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing S.C. 
Code Ann.§ 39-5-140). 
An impact on public interest may be shown if the acts or practices have the potential for 
repetition. Burbach v. Inv'rs Mgmt. Corp. Int'l, 326 S.C. 492, 497, 484 S.E.2d 119, 121 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1997). This "potential for repetition" may be demonstrated in either of two ways: (1) by showing the 
same kind of actions occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to occur absent 
deterrence, or (2) by showing the company's procedures create a potential for repetition of the unfair and 
deceptive acts. Singleton v. Stokes Motors, Inc., 358 S.C. 369,379, 595 S.E.2d 461,466 (S.C. 2004). See 
also Ameristone Tile, LLC v. Ceramic Consulting Corp., 966 F. Supp. 2d 604, 621 (D.S.C. 2013) ("[T]he 
plaintiff in a SCUTPA action is required only to allege and prove those facts sufficient to demonstrate 
potential for repetition; at that point, [the] plaintiff has proven an adverse effect on the public interest 
sufficient to recover under the SCUTP A"). 
Here, Defendants argue this claim fails under South Carolina law because Plaintiff failed to allege 
an injury to the public interest. However, Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants engaged in multiple 
types of unfair and deceptive acts, including making misrepresentations about Plaintiffs' business to its 
customers in order to mislead and deceive them, trespassing onto Plaintiffs' premises to aggressively 
solicit Plaintiffs' customers in person in an effort to take away their business, and soliciting Plaintiffs' 
employees by offering financial incentives to divert customers from Plaintiffs to Defendants. Plaintiffs 
further allege Defendants are not only continuing to engage in such conduct but that Defendants' 
management encourages, promotes and/or ratifies such conduct. These allegations are sufficient to state a 
claim for unfair competition under SCUPT A. As such, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Count II under 
SCUPTA is DENIED. 
15 
b. Common law claims alleging unfair competition 
"In the absence of a statute ... at least with respect to a state where the common law is in force, a 
Georgia court will apply the common law as expounded by the courts of Georgia." Coon v. Med. Ctr., 
Inc., 300 Ga. 722, 729, 797 S.E.2d 828, 834 (2017). See Slaton v. Hall, 168 Ga. 710, 148 S.E. 741, 743 
(1929) ("The common law is presumed to be the same in all the American states where it prevails. 
Though courts in the different states may place a different construction upon a principle of common law, 
that does not change the law. There is still only one right construction. If all the American states were to 
construe the same principle of common law incorrectly, the common law would be unchanged"). 
Thus, while Georgia courts "will follow the decisions of a sister state in construing the statutes 
thereof, they are not bound by the interpretation placed upon the common law by the courts of other 
states." Lay v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 131 Ga. 345, 62 S.E. 189, 189 (1908). See Krogg v. Atlanta 
& W.P.R. Co., 77 Ga. 202, 214 (1886) ("We are not bound by the interpretation of the common law, as 
made by the courts of Alabama; as to what is the common law on this subject, this court is not only 
competent to decide, although the accident occurred in Alabama, but it is its duty to decide, the common 
law being the same [in] both jurisdictions"); In re ConAgra Peanut Butter Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 1 :07- 
MD-1845-TWT, 2012 WL 3779088, at *2 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 29, 2012) ("Although the rule in Georgia is lex 
loci delicti, there are exceptions if the lex loci delicti is foreign law. One exception is the application of 
common law. Foreign law does not apply if no foreign statutes are involved") (citing Leavell v. Bank of 
Commerce. 169 Ga. App. 626, 627, 314 S.E.2d 678 (1984); other citations and punctuation omitted). See 
also Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428, 123 S. Ct. 1115, 1122, 155 L. Ed. 2d 1 
(2003). Thus, here, Plaintiffs' common law tort claims alleging unfair competition must be construed 
pursuant to the "common law as expounded by the courts of Georgia." Coon, 300 Ga. at 729. 
"[I]n Georgia the term unfair competition is a nomenclature for the doctrine that one cannot pass 
off his goods as those of another." Nationwide Advert. Serv., Inc. v. Thompson Recruitment Advert., Inc., 
183 Ga. App. 678,682,359 S.E.2d 737, 741 (1987) (citing Hayes v. Hallmark Apts., 232 Ga. 307(3), 207 
S.E.2d 197 (1974)). As summarized by the Supreme Court of Georgia: 
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Unfair competition is a form of unlawful business injury. It consists in passing 
off, or attempting to pass off, on the public, the goods or business of one person 
as and for the goods or business of another. It consists essentially in the conduct 
of a trade or business in such a manner that there is either an express or 
implied representation to that effect. In fact, it may be stated broadly that any 
conduct, the nature and probable tendency and effect of which is to deceive the 
public so as to pass off the goods or business of one person as and for the goods 
or business of another, constitutes actionable unfair competition. The essence 
thereof consists in the sale of the goods of one manufacturer or vendor for those 
of another. It is the palming off by one of his goods as the goods of another, and 
nothing less than conduct tending to pass off one man's goods or business as the 
goods or business of another will constitute unfair competition. The basic 
principle of the law of unfair competition is that no one has a right to dress up his 
goods or business or otherwise represent the same in such manner as to deceive 
an intending purchaser and induce him to believe he is buying the goods of 
another, and that no one has a right to avail himself of another's favorable 
reputation in order to sell his own goods. The present tendency is to decide every 
case on the ground of unfair competition, by making the decision tum on whether 
or not the effect of what was done is to pass off the goods or business of one man 
as the goods or business of another. Unless it appears that there is or will 
probably be a deception of ordinary buyers and the general public into thinking 
that the goods or business of one is the business or goods of another and thus 
bring about the sale of one man's goods as the goods of the other, the case is 
damnum absque injuria for which no action lies. 
Atlanta Paper Co. v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 184 Ga. 205, 212-13, 190 S.E. 777, 782-83 (1937). See Kay 
Jewelry Co. v. Kapiloff, 204 Ga. 209, 209, 49 S.E.2d 19, 20 (1948) ("In our reported cases where the 
question of unfair trade competition was involved, the litigants were engaged in a competitive business or 
dealt in competitive goods, and the 'passing off rule has been sufficient to afford a test as to whether 
there was unfair competition. The test under this rule is whether the goods or business of one are in fact 
'passed off as the goods or business of another, and it has been said, in cases between litigants in actual 
and direct market competition, that nothing less than such conduct will constitute unfair competition"); 
Carter v. Carter Elec. Co., 156 Ga. 297, 119 S.E. 737, 740 (1923) ("The essence of the wrong in unfair 
competition consists in the sale of the goods of one person for that of another; and if defendant is not 
attempting to palm off its goods as those of complainant the action fails"). See also Saunders Sys. Atlanta 
Co. v. Drive It Yourself Co. of Georgia, 158 Ga. 1, 123 S.E. 132, 133, 135 (1924) (noting "the doctrine of 
secondary meaning ... is the origin of the law of unfair competition, as distinguished from technical trade- 
marks or trade-names: 'If the defendant, as a matter of fact, by his conduct is passing off his goods as the 
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plaintiffs goods, or his business as plaintiffs business, a case of unfair competition is made. The test is 
whether the public is likely to be deceived"') (citing Reddaway v. Banham, 65 L. J. Q. B. 381 (1896)). 
See, e.g., Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 42, 222 S.E.2d 322, 330 (1976); Multiple Listing Serv., Inc. v. 
Metro. Multi-List, Inc., 223 Ga. 837, 841-42, 159 S.E.2d 52, 55 (1968), as modified, 225 Ga. 129, 166 
S.E.2d 356 (1969); Dolphin Homes Corp. v. Tocomc Dev. Corp .. 223 Ga. 455,456, 156 S.E.2d 45, 47 
(1967); Citizens Jewelry Co. v. Savelle Jewelry Co. of Albany, 219 Ga. 409,411, 133 S.E.2d 858,860 
(1963); Gordy v. Dunwody, 209 Ga. 627, 634, 74 S.E.2d 886, 891 (1953), as modified, 210 Ga. 810, 83 
S.E.2d 7 (1954); Fraser v. Singer, 211 Ga. 26, 27, 83 S.E.2d 599, 600 (1954); First Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n v. First Fin. & Thrift Corp., 207 Ga. 695, 64 S.E.2d 58 (1951); Gano v. Gano, 203 Ga. 637, 640-41, 
47 S.E.2d 741, 743 (1948); Indus. Inv. Co. v. Mitchell, 164 Ga. 437, 138 S.E. 908 (1927); Rome Mach. & 
Foundry Co. v. Davis Foundry & Mach. Works Works, 135 Ga. 17, 68 S.E. 800, 800 (1910); First 
Georgia Leasing, Inc. v. First Georgia Bank, 188 Ga. App. 847,847,374 S.E.2d 751, 751 (1988). 
In the case at bar, Plaintiffs do not allege that any Defendant attempted to deceive the public by 
"passing off, or attempting to pass off, on the public, the goods or business of [Plaintiffs] as and for the 
goods or business of [Defendants]." Atlanta Paper Co., 184 Ga. at 212. Further, Plaintiffs have not 
provided any Georgia authority supporting Plaintiffs' "broad view of unfair competition. "23 Absent such, 
the Court is compelled to find Plaintiffs' common law unfair competition claims fail as a matter of 
Georgia law. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to those common law unfair competition 
claims.24 
(4) Tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintifs' prospective CSO contracts and 
business relationships (Count IV/5 
With respect to Count IV, Plaintiffs allege Defendants "willfully and intentionally" interfered 
with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective contracts and business relationships by, inter alia: entering 
23 
24 
Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 24. 
However, Plaintiffs' unfair competition claims asserted under the statutes of Utah, Ohio, New Mexico, and 
South Carolina remain for adjudication. 
25 Insofar as the Court has already dismissed Count III (tortious interference with Drummond's prospective 
CSO contracts and business relationships) as preempted by Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims, it is not addressed here. 
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Plaintiffs' store properties to solicit Plaintiffs' customers directly by offering cash or other financial 
incentives and representing Defendants can offer a lower interest rate title loan despite not knowing the 
interest rates offered by Plaintiffs; and soliciting Plaintiffs' employees by offering them cash to divert 
Plaintiffs' current and prospective customers to Defendants.26 Plaintiffs allege such conduct has caused 
them injury, including the "the loss of business goodwill and loss of interest payments they would have 
otherwise received under the prospective title loan contracts", and assert Defendants' conduct violates the 
laws of Alabama, Utah, Ohio, Missouri, Virginia, Texas, New Mexico, South Carolina, Arizona, 
Tennessee and Georgia.27 
Although Plaintiffs generally allege Defendants' conduct violates certain states' laws, they fail to 
specify any specific statutory authority in the relevant states under which they assert Count IV. As such, 
the Court must presume they are asserted under the common law and, for the same reasons summarized in 
Part I(B)(3)(b), supra, the Court construes Plaintiffs' common law claims alleging tortious interference 
with Plaintiffs' contracts and business relations under Georgia law. See Coon, 300 Ga. at 729; Slaton, 168 
Ga. at 710; Lay, 131 Ga. at 345. Krogg, 77 Ga. at 214. 
As construed in Georgia, 
[t]he elements of tortious interference with contractual relations, business 
relations, or potential business relations are: (1) improper action or 
wrongful conduct by the defendant without privilege; (2) the defendant 
acted purposely and with malice with the intent to injure; (3) the 
defendant induced a breach of contractual obligations or caused a party 
or third parties to discontinue or fail to enter into an anticipated business 
relationship with the plaintiff; and (4) the defendant's tortious conduct 
proximately caused damage to the plaintiff. 
Northeast Georgia Cancer Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc., 297 Ga. App. 28, 33, 
676 S.E.2d 428, 433 (2009). "For purposes of this type of tort, 'privilege' means legitimate economic 
interests of the defendant or a legitimate relationship of the defendant to the contract, so that it is not 
considered a stranger, interloper, or meddler." Disaster Servs., Inc. v. ERC P'ship, 228 Ga. App. 739, 741, 
492 S.E.2d 526,529 (1997). Further, "'[m]alice' in th[is] context means any unauthorized interference or 
26 
27 
F AC, iMJ 125-127. 
FAC, iMJ 128, 130. 
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any interference without legal justification or excuse." Carroll Anesthesia Assocs., P.C. v. AnestheCare, 
Inc., 234 Ga. App. 646, 648, 507 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1998) (citing Arford v. Blalock, 199 Ga. App. 434, 
441(13), 405 S.E.2d 698 (1991)). 
Improper, non-privileged conduct is an essential element of this tort. Thus, the "[p]laintiff must 
show more than that the defendant simply persuaded a person to break a contract." Kirkland v. Tamplin, 
285 Ga. App. 241, 244, 645 S.E.2d 653, 656 (2007) ( citations omitted). Rather, the "plaintiff must adduce 
evidence of "improper action or wrongful conduct," which Georgia courts have defined to mean 
"wrongful action that generally involves predatory tactics such as physical violence, fraud or 
misrepresentation, defamation, use of confidential information, abusive civil suits, and unwarranted 
criminal prosecutions." Id. 
In moving to dismiss the tortious interference claims, Defendants assert competitive behavior is 
not actionable in tort and Plaintiffs have "failed to demonstrate that. .. Defendants' alleged conduct was 
not privileged."28 Further, Defendants argue Plaintiffs failed to adequately plead damages and "failed to 
identify a single contract that was breached or a prospective business relationship that was lost as a result 
of Defendants' alleged conduct.?" Having considered the pleadings and allegations in support of the 
tortious interference claims, summarized supra, and construing the allegations in the light most favorable 
to Plaintiffs, the Court finds Plaintiffs have sufficiently pled each element of Count IV so as to satisfy 
Georgia's notice pleading standard." Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to Count IV. 
U. TITLEMAX GEORGIA'S MOTION TO ADD PARTIES 
In this action TitleMax Georgia asserts counterclaims against Plaintiffs North American Title 
Loans, LLC ("NATL") and Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc. ("CLM") for violations of the Lanham Act, 
unfair business practices and civil conspiracy. In its Motion to Add Parties, TitleMax Georgia requests 
leave of Court to file an amended pleading adding various parties as counterclaim defendants pursuant to 




Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 19. 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, p. 20. 
See, e.g., FAC, ,i,i 86-89, 92-95, 98, 119-122, 125-130. 
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(1) AndR, Inc.; (2) Atlanta Title Loans, Inc.; (3) Aycox,Inc.; (4) Aycox & Aycox Clayton, Inc.; (5) 
Aycox & Martin Enterprises, Inc.; (6) Aycox Enterprises, Ltd.; (7) Cash Loans of Stone Mountain, Inc.; 
(8) Instant Cash Loans on Car Titles, Inc.; (9) LoanMax Title Loans, LLC; and (10) Mableton Car Title 
Loans, Inc. (collectively the "Missing Parties"). Defendant asserts these Missing Parties and potentially 
others as of yet unidentified entities are affiliates of Plaintiffs and they own and/or operate the majority of 
the title pawn stores in Georgia which Defendant alleges in its counterclaim are violating state and federal 
law and are allegedly engaging in deceptive trade practices, including misleading advertising, and civil 
conspiracy to engage in deceptive trade practices. 
Under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-19, a new party must be joined when "complete relief cannot be afforded 
among those who are already parties" in its absence. See also O.C.G.A. § 9-l l-13(h) ("When the 
presence of parties other than those to the original action is required for the granting of complete relief in 
the determination of a counterclaim or cross-claim, the court shall order them to be brought in as 
defendants as provided in this chapter, if jurisdiction of them can be obtained"). "The concept of complete 
relief embraces the desirability of avoiding repetitive lawsuits on essentially the same facts or subject 
matter, as well as the desirability of joining those in whose absence there might be a grant of hollow or 
partial relief to the parties before the court." Searcy v. Searcy, 280 Ga. 311, 313 (2006). Under O.C.G.A. 
§9-11-20 parties may be joined when they assert----or have asserted against them-any right to relief 
"arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and if any 
question of law or fact common to all of them will arise in the action." 
Here, given the procedural history of this case, the positions taken by the parties during the course 
of these proceedings with respect to their respective title pawn enterprises operating in Georgia, and the 
nature of the counterclaims and relief sought by Defendants, the Court agrees joinder of the Missing 
Parties is appropriate pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-19. Further, the Court finds permissive joinder under 
O.C.G .A. §9-11-20 would also be authorized insofar as Defendant seeks to assert a right to relief against 
the Missing Parties arising out of the same "series of transactions or occurrences" as alleged in its 
counterclaim (e.g., an alleged enterprise-wide practice of engaging in misleading advertising in violation 
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of state and federal law) and common question of law or fact exist given Defendant alleges the Missing 
Parties are engaging in similar unfair practices, including using similar advertising and trade dress. 
Accordingly, TitleMax Georgia's Motion to Add Parties is hereby GRANT ED and the Court 
orders that the Missing Parties be added as counterclaim defendants in this action. Within ten (l 0) days of 
the entry of this order Plaintiffs shall supplement their discovery responses to identify any additional 
third-party affiliates that have owned or operated stores in Georgia since December 29, 2010 or notify 
Defendant that no such additional affiliates exist. Those additional third-party affiliates, if any, shall also 
be added as counterclaim defendants. Within fifteen (15) days of the entry of this order, Defendant 
TitleMax of Georgia, Inc. must file its amended pleading adding the foregoing parties and must thereafter 
promptly perfect service upon those added parties. 
III. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND III OF DEFENDANTS' 
AMENDED TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM AND MOTION 
TO DISMISS COUNTS II AND III OF DEFENDANTS' SECOND AMENDED 
TWENTY-FOURTH DEFENSE AND COUNTERCLAIM31 
In their Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim as asserted m the Amended Answer, 
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim ("Amended Answer and Counterclaim") and Second Amended 
Answer, Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim ("Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim"), certain 
TMX Defendants assert a counterclaim against certain Drummond Plaintiffs32 alleging misappropriation 
and theft of trade secrets (Counterclaim II) and violations of the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and 
Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, O.C.G.A. §§16-14-1 et seq. (Counterclaim III), among other 
claims. The Drummond Respondents moved to dismiss Counterclaims II and III for failure to state a 
31 See note 6, supra. Although the parties repeatedly reference matters outside of the pleadings in their 
respective briefs and make assertions regarding what evidence does or does not exist, the Court here has limited its 
review of this motion to the pleadings. 
32 The Twenty-Fourth Defense and Counterclaim as asserted in Defendants' Amended Answer and Second 
Amended Answer are specifically brought by: TitleMax of Ohio, Inc.; TitleMax of Utah, Inc.; TitleMax of Virginia, 
Inc.; TitleMax of Alabama, Inc.; TitleMax of Georgia, Inc.; TitleMax of Arizona, Inc.; TitleMax of Missouri, Inc.; 
TitleMax of Texas, Inc.; and TitleMax of South Carolina, Inc. (collectively referred to in this Section as "TitleMax 
Claimants"). Their counterclaims have been asserted against: Drummond Financial Services, LLC, North American 
Title Loans, LLC, a Georgia limited liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a South Carolina limited 
liability company; North American Title Loans, LLC, a Utah limited liability company; Anderson Financial 
Services, LLC; Huffman Title Pawn, Inc.; LoanMax, LLC; Mid-American Title Loans, LLC; Fairfax Financial 
Services, LLC; Wellshire Financial Services, LLC; Cash Loans of Marietta, Inc., and Meadowwood Financial 
Services, LLC (collectively referred to in this Section as "Drummond Respondents"). 
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claim, asserting the TitleMax Claimants failed to allege sufficient facts in support of those counterclaims. 
The TitleMax Claimants thereafter filed their Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim to include 
additional factual allegations in support thereof. The Drummond Respondents have again moved to 
dismiss, asserting the amended pleading still fails to state a claim as to Counterclaims II and III. 
A. Misappropriation of trade secret 
In their Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, the TitleMax Claimants allege, inter alia: 
[Drummond Respondents] sent their employees (sometimes known as 
"Operations Specialists") to [TitleMax Claimants'] stores under false pretenses. 
[Drummond Respondents'] Operations Specialists filled out pawn applications 
even though they did not need to pawn anything, lied about their employers, and 
utilized other fraudulent means of obtaining information that would be useful in 
competing against [TitleMax Claimants]. 
Among other things, on multiple occasions, [Drummond Respondents'] 
Operations Specialists asked to use the bathroom in [TitleMax Claimants'] 
stores, which are located in non-public areas of those stores. On the way to and 
from the bathroom, [Drummond Respondents'] Operations Specialists would 
illegally trespass on non-public areas of [TitleMax Claimants'] stores via 
false pretenses and surreptitiously photograph financial [sic] [TitleMax 
Claimants'] confidential and proprietary information. The financial information 
illegally obtained by [Drummond Respondents'] Operations Specialists included 
[TitleMax Claimants'] "goal boards" which are summaries of sales targets (based 
on past performance) and financial progress.33 
TitleMax Claimants assert, for example, that Zachary Farmer, one the Drummond Respondents' 
Operations Specialists, emailed his supervisor multiple pictures of TitleMax Claimants' "goal boards and 
other documents containing confidential and proprietary information.?" TitleMax Claimants allege their 
trade secrets include, among other things, the goal boards the Drummond Respondents illegally 
photographed and misappropriated through unlawful access and disclosure to unauthorized persons.35 
In their motion, Drummond Respondents urge TitleMax Claimants have not alleged facts 
sufficient to show that they made reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information displayed 
on their goal boards. Further, they assert TitleMax Claimants cannot show that they maintained the 




Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ,ii] 36-37 at pp. 43-44. 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, i!38 at p. 44. 
Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, ,i48-50 at p. 47. 
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accessible to the general public in high-traffic areas and TitleMax employees undisputedly allowed the 
public access to view the information on the way to and from the bathroom. 
However, regardless of which state law applies, the issues raised in Drummond Respondents' 
motions are matters which cannot be resolved based on the pleadings. TitleMax Claimants allege that they 
took "reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the[ir] confidential information" but that Drummond 
employees posing as potential customers/vendors, although given permi ssion to use the bathroom in non- 
public store areas, would then "illegally trespass on non-public areas ... [ of the] stores via false pretenses" 
in order to photograph TitleMax Claimants' confidential and proprietary information. The reasonableness 
of TitleMax Claimants' actions to maintain this information secret (which may very well depend on 
where exactly the goal boards and other allegedly confidential and proprietary information were located, 
whether any Drummond employees exceeded the permission given to go to the bathroom to access other 
non-public areas, etc.) is a matter which cannot be assessed at the pleadings stage. The claim has been 
sufficiently pled such that the Drummond Respondents' Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED with 
respect to the misappropriation of trade secrets claim. 36 
B. RICO claim 
"To assert a civil claim based upon either a violation of the RICO statute or a conspiracy to 
violate that statute, a plaintiff must show that the defendants violated or conspired to violate 
the RICO statute; that as a result of this conduct the plaintiff has suffered injury; and that the defendant's 
violation of or conspiracy to violate the RICO statute was the proximate cause of the injury." Wylie v. 
Denton, 323 Ga. App. 161, 165, 746 S.E.2d 689, 693 (2013) (citing Cox v. Mayan Lagoon Estates. 319 
Ga. App. 101, 109(2)(b), 734 S.E.2d 883 (2012)). 
Under Georgia's RICO statute, it is "unlawful for any person, through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or proceeds derived therefrom, to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or 
control of any enterprise, real property, or personal property of any nature, including money." O.C.G.A. § 
36 The Court takes no position on whether TitleMax Claimants' trade secrets claims will ultimately survive 
summary judgment. 
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16-14-4(a). A "racketeering activity," also known as a "predicate act," is the commi ssion of, the attempt 
to commi t, or the solicitation or coercing of another to commi t a "crime which is chargeable by 
indictment" under certain laws of the state of Georgia and the United States. O.C.G.A. §16-14-3(5); 
Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 164. Further, "pattern of racketeering activity" means to engage in at least two 
acts of racketeering activity that are "interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated 
incidents" and that were done "in furtherance of one or more incidents, schemes, or transactions." 
O.C.G.A. § 16-14-3(4). 
Here, the Drummond Respondents assert the TitleMax Claimants have failed to state a RICO 
claim because: they cannot allege sufficient facts to show they made reasonable efforts to maintain the 
secrecy of their alleged trade secret information; the "racketeering activity" on which the claim is 
predicated did not occur in Georgia and, thus, does not constitute a "theft of trade secrets" under 
Georgia's criminal law; and the proximate-cause standard applicable to RICO claims has not been met. 
For the reasons stated above, the reasonableness of the TitleMax Claimants' actions to maintain 
the secrecy of their trade secrets has been sufficiently alleged and whether evidence can be produced in 
support of those allegations is to be determined. Further, the Court finds the RICO claim has been 
adequately pled.37 Although the Drummond Respondents contend all of the racketeering activity alleged 
by TitleMax Claimants occurred out of state such that it does not give rise to a Georgia RICO claim, 
TitleMax Claimants allege the Drummond Respondents repeatedly directed their employees to visit 
37 The Drummond Respondents also assert the TitleMax Claimants have failed to plead their Georgia RICO 
claim with the requisite particularity, citing Pombert v. Glock. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 3d 1321 (N.D. Ga. 2016). See Id. at 
1335 (citing Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 482 F.3d 1309, 1316 (11th Cir.2007)) ("RICO claims 'are 
essentially a certain breed of fraud claims, [and] must be pied with an increased level of specificity'"). Notably, the 
court in Pombert relied on another federal district case (see Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co.) where the RICO claim 
was predicated on allegations of fraud and where that court in turn relied on other federal authority predicated on 
fraud allegations (see Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 1 I 6 F.3d I 364, 1381 (1 I th Cir. 1997)) as 
well the federal pleading standard under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Having considered the 
TitleMax Claimants' amended pleadings, given the current posture of the case, and in light of Georgia's notice 
pleading standard and that there is no binding authority indicating all RICO claims, even those not predicated on 
fraud, are nevertheless subject to a heightened pleadings standard under O.C.G.A. §9-11-9, the Court finds the 
RICO claim has been sufficiently pied. See also Maddox v. S. Eng'g Co., 216 Ga. App. 6, 7 (1994) (error to dismiss 
RICO claim which was based on defendants' alleged violation ofO.C.G.A. §16-10-20, for making false statements 
to government entities where the plaintiff did not specify what false statements were made, noting the defendants 
could move for a more definite statement). 
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TitleMax stores, including stores in Texas, South Carolina, Alabama and Ohio, to obtain financial 
information through improper and/or unlawful means and that TitleMax's trade secret information once 
obtained was then "shared across the [Drummond Respondents'] corporate structure.t'" Based on the 
pleadings, the Court cannot says as a matter of law that the TitleMax Claimants "could not possibly 
introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the 
relief sought" as to the civil RICO claim. 
Finally, the Drummond Defendants assert the applicable proximate cause requirement to assert a 
RICO claim cannot possibly be met here. 
To satisfy the proximate cause element of RICO, a plaintiff must show that her 
injury flowed directly from at least one of the predicate acts. Longino v. Bank of 
Ellijay, 228 Ga. App. 37, 41(2), 491 S.E.2d 81 (1997). This burden is not met 
where a plaintiff shows "merely that his injury was an eventual consequence of 
the [predicate act] or that he would not have been injured but for the [predicate 
act]." Maddox v. Southern Engineering Co., 231 Ga. App. 802, 806(1), 500 
S.E.2d 591 (1998) ... Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff asserting 
a RICO claim must allege more than that an act of racketeering occurred and that 
she was injured. Longino, supra. Rather, she must show that her injury was 
the direct result of a predicate act targeted toward her, such that she was the 
intended victim. Nicholson, [257 Ga. App. 429, 431(1), 571 S.E.2d 466 
(2002)] ... See also Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 
F.3d 1292, 1307(2) (11th Cir.2003) (in determining whether a plaintiff has 
satisfactorily alleged a RICO claim, a court should examine whether the 
alleged predicate acts were aimed at the plaintiff or whether they were 
aimed primarily at a third party) ... 
Wylie, 323 Ga. App. at 166. 
In the case at bar, the TitleMax Claimants have alleged the Drummond Respondents took direct 
action against them, targeting their stores by sending their employees to unlawfully acquire their financial 
trade secret information to gain a competitive advantage over them in the marketplace and resulting in 
damage to them specifically, including the loss of prospective customers, loss of business goodwill and 
loss of interest payments under prospective contracts. The TitleMax Claimants have sufficiently alleged 
injury proximately caused by the Drummond Respondents' alleged racketeering activity. The Drummond 
Respondents' Motion to Dismiss the civil RICO claim is hereby DENIED. 
38 Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, iJ39. 
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IV. DISCOVERY RELATED MOTIONS AND DISPUTES 
A. Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel regarding First Interrogatories and RPDs 
In their latest Motion to Compel, Plaintiffs ask the Court to compel Defendants to produce 
information and documents: related to Defendants' alleged misconduct in specific Named States'"; 
regarding Defendants use of DMV records to solicit Plaintiffs' customers; and from certain categories of 
custodians likely to have electronically stored information ("ESI") relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. 
(1) Discovery related to Defendants' operations and alleged tortious conduct in Named States 
Plaintiffs seek information and documents related to Defendants and their employees' alleged 
misconduct in the Named States, including information regarding: Defendants and their employees' use 
of DMV databases; employees who engaged in DMV Searching and their supervisors; persons contacted 
using DMV record information and the employees who contacted them; and employees who offered to 
pay referral fees to Plaintiffs' employees for the referral of business (see Plaintiffs' First Interrogatories 
Nos. 2-7). 
Also, Plaintiffs seek documents and communications identifying and/or related to: Defendants' 
offices, stores, or branches located in the Named States; Defendants' employees' marketing of services in 
the parking lots of Plaintiffs' offices, stores or branches and their marketing to and soliciting business 
from persons entering or leaving Plaintiffs' premises; Defendants' employees' recording, copying or 
acquiring the license plate or vehicle identification numbers of vehicles located in the parking lots of 
Plaintiffs' premises; Defendants' employees' offering Plaintiffs' employees/agents incentives to refer 
persons to Defendants; Defendants' employees' visiting Plaintiffs' premises in the Named Stated for the 
purpose of marketing Defendants' services to Plaintiffs' employees; Defendants' employees' DMV 
Searching; any contracts or agreements between Defendants or their employees and any other person or 
DMV database providing access to motor vehicle records; Defendants' employees' use of DMV 
databases in connection with marketing to Plaintiffs' current or potential customers in the Named States; 
39 The Named States as defined in Plaintiffs' discovery requests include: Alabama, Arizona, California, 
Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, Nevada, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, 
Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. 
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documents or communications obtained from any OMV database regarding Plaintiffs' current or former 
customers in the Named States; documents or communications exchanged between employees and 
Plaintiffs related to the conduct alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint; Defendants' practices, policies and 
procedures relating to the marketing of Defendants' services to current or potential customers and to 
Plaintiffs' current or potential customers; and disciplinary action taken with respect to any 
employees/agents for OMV Searching, offering to pay/paying referral fees to Plaintiffs' employees/agents 
in exchange for the referral of business, or for marketing Defendants' services in the parking lots of 
Plaintiffs' premises (see Plaintiff First Requests for Production of Documents ("RPO") Nos. 1, 3-10, 12- 
17,19,50). 
The Court is compelled to note this motion is directed to certain discovery requests which this 
Court already ordered produced in its Feb. 17, 2017 Order on Discovery Disputes; e.g. Plaintiffs' First 
Interrogatories Nos. 2-6 and First RPO Nos. 12, 13, 15, and 50. If they have not done so already, 
Defendants must comply with the Court's previous order compelling full and complete responses to the 
foregoing discovery requests. 
Further, although Defendants object to Plaintiffs' discovery requests seeking information and 
documents with respect to non-party affiliates given the parties' agreement to adhere to third-party 
discovery practice regarding affiliated non-parties to this case, any such agreement was not formalized on 
the record by stipulation or consent order and such would not relieve the parties of their discovery 
obligations under the Civil Practice Act. To the extent responsive, non-privileged information is available 
to Defendants and/or Defendants have responsive, non-privileged documents or communications within 
their "possession, custody, or control", they are obligated to produce same. See O.C.G.A. §9-1 l-33(a) 
("Any party may serve upon any other party written interrogatories to be answered by the party served 
or, ... who shall furnish such information as is available to the party"); O.C.G.A. §9-11-34(a) ("Any party 
may serve on any other party a request: (1) To produce ... any tangible things which constitute or contain 
matters within the scope of subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-26 and which are in the possession, 
custody, or control of the party upon whom the request is served"). See also Lion Antique Cars & 
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Investments, Inc. v. Tafel, 332 Ga. App. 824, 826, 775 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2015) (in dispute between 
company and former associates to recover race cars, no abuse of discretion in holding company in 
contempt for failing to produce documents related to non-party's use of car as ordered given evidence of 
close relationship between company's president and non-party and that company was able to obtain some 
documents from non-party, demonstrating company had a measure of control over documents despite 
being in non-party's possession). 
The Court finds the requested discovery by Plaintiffs is likely to lead to the discovery of relevant 
and admi ssible evidence. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' request to compel complete responses to First 
Interrogatories Nos. 2-7 and First RPD Nos. 1, 3-10, 12-17, 19, and 30 is GRANTED and Defendants are 
ordered to answer and produce any responsive documents in their possession, custody or control. 
(2) DMV records 
Plaintiffs request information regarding Defendants' employees' allegedly unlawful DMV 
Searching, use of DMV databases and use of DMV records to solicit Plaintiffs' customers as set forth in 
First RPD Nos. 12-16 and 50 (summarized above). The Court previously granted Plaintiffs' motion to 
compel regarding First RPD Nos. 12, 13, 15, and 50. Again, if they have not done so already, Defendants 
must comply with the Court's previous order requiring full and complete responses to the foregoing 
discovery requests. 
To the extent Defendants object to the discovery based on the Supreme Court's holding that 
Plaintiffs have not stated a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets under Georgia law, the Court's 
rulings in Part I, supra, outline the relevant law applicable to Plaintiffs' claims as asserted in their 
pleadings. In accordance with the Court's rulings herein, there remain claims at issue to which Plaintiffs' 
discovery requests are relevant and are reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence. As such, Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel responses to their First RPD Nos. 12-16 and 50 is 
GRANTED. 
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(3) ESI searches of custodians 
The parties have already engaged in considerable discovery regarding ESL However, Plaintiffs 
ask the Court to compel Defendants to search for ESI from "thousands of additional custodians", 
specifically: employees in executive level positions (those holding the positions of President, Senior Vice 
President of Operations, Vice President of Operations, and Divisional Vice President who had 
responsibilities over any of the Named States) ("Executive custodians"); employees in managerial 
positions (those holding the positions of Regional Manager, District Manager and General Managers with 
responsibilities over any of the Named States) ("Management custodians"); Defendants' marketing 
department and employees working therein ("Marketing custodians"); Defendants' Legal, Human 
Resources, and Compliance Departments and employees therein ("Legal, HR, and Compliance 
custodians"); and Defendants' store-level email addresses for stores in certain cities or within 10 miles 
thereof (i.e. Albuquerque, New Mexico; Columbus, Ohio; Navarre, Ohio; Akron, Ohio; and Gaffney, 
South Carolina) ("Store-level custodians"). 
Defendants agreed to search for and collect documents regarding 100 custodians. However, 
Defendants contend Plaintiffs' requests would require searching ESI related to thousands of additional 
employees and would cost millions of dollars. Defendants assert they have already incurred $1 million 
related to ESI discovery to search for responsive documents from 100 custodians. They estimate ESI 
discovery as to the additional custodians would cost approximately $10,000 per custodian. Further, 
Defendants estimate Plaintiffs' additional requests would involve ESI related to an additional 5,700 
employees given that: 205 employees fall into the categories of Executive custodians and Legal, HR, and 
Compliance custodians; approximately 5,480 employees fall into the category of Management custodians; 
and 15 employees would be considered Store-level custodians. Based on the foregoing, Defendants 
estimate the additional cost to conduct ESI as to the additional custodians could be more than $50 million. 
The Court previously directed counsel to meet and confer regarding the ESI dispute in order to 
identify the custodians at issue, for Plaintiffs to particularize what information is sought and for the 
parties to narrow requests accordingly so as to facilitate efficient and cost effective discovery. Although 
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Defendants have provided the foregoing figures, Plaintiffs assert Defendants have failed to provide them 
with specific information regarding the additional custodians which they contend is necessary to have an 
informed discussion. 
The Court orders Defendants to, within twenty (20) days of this order, provide Plaintiffs a list of 
the additional 5,700 custodians they have identified including, where practical and available, each 
individual's name, position, type of custodian and, where appropriate, geographic assignment. During that 
same twenty (20) day period Plaintiffs should review the ESI already provided, and both sides should 
consider the posture of the case and remaining claims in light of the Court's rulings herein. 
Within twenty (20) days thereafter, counsel are directed to meet and confer in an informed, good faith 
effort to narrow the number of custodians at issue. If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the 
parties must promptly notify the Court and within fifteen ( I 5) days of the meet and confer, Plaintiffs shall 
supplement their Motion to Compel to identify with particularity the individual custodians to which they 
assert additional searches for ESI should be conducted and the factual and legal basis supporting same. 
Defendants shall have fifteen ( 15) days thereafter to provide any response. The parties are, again, warned 
that, given the costs involved, if additional ESI is permitted the Court will consider cost shifting. 
B. Defendants' Motion to Compel 
Defendants ask the Court to compel Plaintiffs to fully respond to certain discovery requests.l" 
Specifically, Defendants seek: (a) an audited balance sheet for each Plaintiff (Defendants' RPD No. 49); 
(b) any documents concerning actions Plaintiffs take to determine where a former customer obtains a 
loan, pawn, or credit services if bought out by another lender, pawnbroker, or Credit Services 
Organization, sometimes referred to as "buy-outs" (Defendants' RPD No. 4); and (c) certain personnel 
files maintained by Plaintiffs (Defendants' RPD Nos. 34, 35, 38, 42, 47).41 
40 See generally Defendants' Second Set of Requests for Production of Documents (hereinafter Defendants' 
"RPD"). 
41 Defendants' objection to Plaintiffs' unilateral temporal limitation placed on certain interrogatory responses 
has been mooted by Plaintiffs' supplemental discovery responses. 
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(I) Audited balance sheets 
The Court finds Defendants have at least made a prima facie showing of the factual basis 
supporting their claim for punitive damages and the requested discovery is relevant and discoverable with 
respect to that claim. See Holman v. Burgess, 404 S.E.2d 144, 147 (Ga. App. 1991). Accordingly, 
Defendants' request to compel a response to RPO No. 49 is GRANTED. 
(2) Documents related to buy-outs 
The Court finds Defendants' request for documentation of how Plaintiffs track customer "buy- 
outs" is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims 
and on the issue of damages. Accordingly, Defendants' request to compel a response to RPO No. 4 is 
GRANTED IN PART. To the extent Plaintiffs in the regular course of business maintain any such 
documentation tracking buy-outs, same must be produced and provided to Defendants. If no such 
documentation exists, Plaintiffs must so advise Defendants in their response to RPO No. 4. The foregoing 
notwithstanding, any such tracking conducted by an attorney in preparation for litigation remams 
privileged and is protected from discovery. See O.C.G.A. §§ 9-l l-26(b)(l), 24-5-50l(a)(2). 
(3) Personnel files 
Defendants' RPO Nos. 34, 35, 38, 42, and 47 seek certain personnel files maintained by Plaintiffs 
and documentation generally regarding certain employees' pay and bonus structure and compensation. 
Defendants have narrowed their requests to seek only those portions of the subject personnel files 
discussing "reprimands and accolades". The Court finds the foregoing requests are reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence relevant to Defendants' claims and, specifically, their 
theory that Plaintiffs' agents were sent to Defendants' stores to obtain Defendants' trade secret 
information. The Court further finds the requests, as limited by Defendants, are narrowly tailored, 
reasonable in scope, and discoverable. See DeLoitte Haskins & Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 377, 
370 S.E.2d 194, 195-96 (1988); Contino v. Winn-Dixie Stores. Inc., No. CV214-146, 2015 WL 2226229, 
at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 12, 2015). Thus, Defendants' request to compel a response to RPO Nos. 34, 35, 38, 
42, and 47 is GRANTED as limited in Defendants' letter briefing. 
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C. Issues related to Plaintiffs' discovery requests raised in letter briefs" 
(1) Documents related to communications with third-parties 
Plaintiffs seek discovery related to communications with third parties and whistleblowers 
regarding the alleged conduct at issue in this case, including communications between anonymous 
whistleblower Humble Veritas, who forwarded to Plaintiffs email correspondence exchanged with 
TitleMax's Director of Human Resources regarding the use of OMV databases to located and solicit 
competitors' customers (Plaintiffs' Third Requests for Production ("Third RPD"), Nos. 1-4, 42, 43). 
Defendants initially objected on the basis the requested discovery is in regards to claims being pursued in 
separate Texas litigation. Defendants subsequently supplemented their discovery responses, agreeing to 
produce the "whistleblower" documents produced in the Texas litigation, and assert the supplemental 
discovery moots Plaintiffs' request to compel further production. 
Defendants' production of certain "whistleblower" documents that were produced in the Texas 
litigation and assertion Defendants are not aware of any other "whistleblowers" other than the one 
identified in the Texas litigation does not squarely address Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Defendants 
should supplement their response to produce any responsive, non-privileged documents and 
communications in their possession or control. 
(2) Personnel files 
Plaintiffs seek documents from the personnel files of certain employees of Defendants involved 
in the conduct at issue in this litigation (Third RPD No. 5) and contend they have narrowed their request 
to seek documents from only the personnel files that relate to the parties' allegations in this action. 
Plaintiffs contend each of the individuals included in this request were directly involved in the conduct at 
issue. Defendants assert they have already agreed to search and produce 40 personnel files but Plaintiffs 
now seek the personnel files of an additional 51 individuals who according to Defendants "have, at best, 
attenuated connections to any issue in the case." 
42 Although the Court's rulings in Part IV(A), supra, on Plaintiffs' Motion to Compel relate to some of the 
same categories of information and/or documents as addressed here, this section relates to discovery disputes 
regarding Plaintiffs' Second Interrogatories, Third RPD, Fourth RPD, and First Requests for Admissions ("RF A"). 
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Generally, employee personnel files are discoverable under Georgia law. See DeLoitte Haskins & 
Sells v. Green, 187 Ga. App. 376, 377, 370 S.E.2d 194, 195-96 (1988); Contino v. Winn-Dixie Stores, 
Inc., No. CV214-146, 2015 WL 2226229, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 12, 2015). Based on the information 
provided, the Court cannot determine these individuals' involvement or relation to the conduct at issue in 
this litigation. Whether the requested information is discoverable as reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims will likely depend on whether the 
individuals have some involvement to the claims or conduct alleged or if, as Defendants allege, they have 
had no material connection to the matters at issue. In light of the Courts' other rulings and instructions 
herein, counsel are directed to meet and confer in good faith regarding this discovery request and the 
remaining personnel files at issue. If an agreement cannot be reached as to which individuals' personnel 
files are relevant to this litigation, the parties are free to file an appropriate motion which identifies the 
relevant individuals and addresses their involvement/lack of involvement with this case. 
(3) Telephone related records 
Plaintiffs seek documents and phone records relating to telephones used by Defendants' stores 
and their employees (specifically the employees identified in response to Plaintiffs' Interrogatory No. 17) 
who have solicited certain specifically named customers of the Plaintiffs (Third RPO Nos. 7 and 8). 
Plaintiffs assert this request should be "straightforward" as Defendants have only identified one employee 
in response to Interrogatory No. 17. Plaintiffs also seek phone records for Defendants' stores located 
within 10 miles of certain cities where Plaintiffs allege their customers have been solicited by Defendants 
(Third RPO No. 9). Upon Defendants' objection that the proposed geographic scope of the request was 
too vague and ambiguous, Plaintiffs agreed to limit their request to a specific time frame for stores located 
in certain zip codes. 
Defendants assert they have agreed to produce the requested documents responsive to RPO Nos. 
7-9, thus, mooting Plaintiffs' request to compel further production. However, Plaintiffs dispute that 
Defendants have complied with their discovery obligations, insofar as they have only agreed to provide 
certain records already in their files and only agreed to provide responsive information for the employee 
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identified in response to Interrogatory No. 17, Taylor McMonigal, during a time period arbitrarily set by 
Defendants which does not correspond to her period of employment and have not agreed to provide 
records for mobile phones that she used while employed by them. 
Irrespective of what may be physically in Defendants' "files", to the extent Defendants have 
reasonable access to or can through reasonable efforts obtain records in response to Plaintiffs' RPD Nos. 
7-9, they are required to do so. See O.C.G.A. §9-11-34(a) ("Any party may serve on any other party 
a request: (1) To produce ... any tangible things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of 
subsection (b) of Code Section 9-11-26 and which are in the possession, custody, or control of the party 
upon whom the request is served"). See also Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc., 332 Ga. App. at 826. 
Further, Defendants do not appear to have articulated a basis for only providing responsive documents 
and phone records relating to telephones used by Taylor McMonigal during a limited time period or why 
they cannot provide records regarding mobile phones she used. 
The Court finds the requested discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. Thus, the request to compel responses to Third RPD Nos. 7-9 is GRANTED. 
(4) Documents related to buy-outs 
Plaintiffs seek information and documents regarding loans Defendants bought out from Plaintiffs 
or originated after soliciting Plaintiffs' customers (Interrogatories 12 and 14; Third RPD Nos. 10, 11, and 
44) and narrowed the request temporally to Nov. 7, 2009 through the present. Defendants have objected 
on the basis that they do not centrally track buyouts and, as a result, the requested documents either do not 
exist or are not reasonably accessible. Defendants assert until recently they did not centrally maintain 
records of loans originated as buyouts or refinances of existing loans and, while it is possible some 
individual stores may informally track this information, Defendants cannot determine which stores do so 
or collect any such records, if they exist, without unreasonable burden, expense and the disruption of its 
business. 
As proposed by Defendants, they are directed to search for and produce information and 
documents regarding the buyout of any of Plaintiffs' customers where the buyout was generated by 
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conduct which Plaintiffs in this action contend was unlawful. Additionally, in line with the Court's ruling 
in Part IV(B)(2), supra, with respect to Defendants' requests for Plaintiffs' buyout documentation, to the 
extent Defendants in the regular course of business maintain any such documentation tracking buyouts of 
Plaintiffs' customers' loans, same must be produced and provided to Plaintiffs. 
(5) DMV records 
Plaintiffs seek documents related to Defendants "use of DMV Records" and Defendants 
"knowledge of, and/or compliance or non-compliance with, any state or federal law relating to the use of 
DMV Records, including, but not limited to, the Drivers' Privacy Protection Act" (Third RPD Nos. 15 
and 16). Plaintiffs offered to limit the request temporally to the time period of Nov. 9, 2009 to the present. 
According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' responses are deficient and although Defendants have agreed 
to produce their "policies on DMV record searching, and non-privileged communications reiterating those 
policies ... from July 1, 2013", such is not responsive to Plaintiffs' discovery requests. Defendants object 
on the basis the requests are overly broad and unduly burdensome, asserting that, insofar as Plaintiffs 
failed to define "DMV Records" and, for example, vehicle titles constitute DMV records,43 Plaintiffs' 
requests would encompass "virtually every document involved in a title or transaction." 
With respect to RPD Nos. 15 and 16, the Court finds the requests encompass relevant and 
discoverable information and documents. However, the Court agrees the requests are overly broad given 
Plaintiffs' failure to narrowly define the term "DMV Records". Counsel are directed to meet and confer in 
good faith regarding an appropriate definition for the term narrowly tailored to the claims at issue and 
thereafter Defendants should supplement their responses accordingly. If the parties are unable to reach an 
agreement on a workable definition, each side should provide a proposed definition narrowly tailored to 
the claims at issue. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs ask Defendants to identify efforts taken to investigate "DMV Searching" 
by employees, including efforts taken to determine which employees engaged in DMV Searching, what 
43 See, e.g., I 8 U.S.C. §2721 (for purposes of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, defining "motor vehicle 
record" to mean "any record that pertains to a motor vehicle operator's permit, motor vehicle title, motor vehicle 
registration, or identification card issued by a department of motor vehicle"). 
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databases were used, the identities of individuals who were contacted using information obtained from 
DMV Searching, and persons with knowledge of such efforts (Interrogatory No. 19). 
Defendants' response that they "are presently unaware of any of their current or former 
employees who have engaged in DMV Searching outside of the individuals already identified in the 
Texas Action" and that they "with the assistance, advice and direction of legal counsel, investigated 
Plaintiffs' allegations of DMV Searching and found no support for the allegations outside of Texas" does 
not actually respond to the interrogatory posed. Although Defendants have asserted this discovery request 
seeks privileged information, the Court agrees Defendants should be able provide some information 
regarding efforts taken to investigate DMV Searching by employees without revealing privileged 
communications or work product. Defendants are directed to supplement their response accordingly with 
non-privileged, responsive information. 
(6) Documents regarding Defendants' investigations into marketing at Plaintifs' premises 
Plaintiffs seek documents relating to efforts taken by Defendants to investigate their employees' 
marketing at Plaintiffs' stores and/or parking lots (Third RPD No. 39). Defendants initially agreed to 
produce responsive documents relating to investigations after this Court's May 28, 2015 Interlocutory 
Injunction Order. However, Defendants have since agreed to produce any non-privileged documents 
relating to pre-injunction investigations responsive to this request, thus, rendering Plaintiffs' request to 
compel further production moot. 
(7) Non-expert information regarding Defendants' damages 
Plaintiffs seek "non-expert" information relating to damages Defendants allege to have suffered 
as a result of Plaintiffs' use of the word "loan" in connection with their advertising in Georgia 
(Interrogatory No. 21; Third RPD No. 41). Defendants object, asserting the requests are premature given 
ongoing discovery and notes the Court has previously refused to compel discovery related to damages on 
that basis and instead has instructed Defendants to supplement their responses at the conclusion of 
discovery. Insofar as discovery is ongoing which may yield information regarding the extent of Plaintiffs' 
practices relevant to these requests, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs' request to compel a response to 
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Interrogatory No. 21 and Third RPD No. 41.However, Defendants are directed to supplement their 
responses to these discovery requests upon the conclusion of discovery. 
(8) Documents regarding disciplinary efforts 
Plaintiffs assert Defendants have provided "incomplete, evasive responses" to their discovery 
requests seeking documents and communications related to disciplinary efforts contemplated or 
implemented by Defendants regarding: Defendants' and its affiliates' employees for engaging in the 
misconduct alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint and the Court's Interlocutory Injunction; and employees' 
failure to comply with Defendants' "policies prohibiting marketing to Plaintiffs" and with Defendants' 
"supplemental initiatives to ensure that its employees comply with the[] policies" as referenced in 
counsel's correspondence dated May 25, 2017 (Fourth RPD Nos. 1-4). Defendants initially only agreed to 
produce documents regarding disciplinary actions with respect to employees of the currently named 
Defendants and one affiliate, InstaLoan, (but not other affiliates) for violations of "Defendants' company 
policies as they pertain to Plaintiffs." In a supplemental response Defendants have agreed to amend their 
responses to include TitleMax's other non-party affiliates. However, Plaintiffs urge the responses remain 
deficient insofar as they are limited to violations of company policy and ignore the remainder of 
Plaintiffs' discover requests. 
The Court finds the requested discovery is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence relevant to Plaintiffs' claims. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-1 l-26(b)(l), 9-11-34(a). See also 
Lion Antique Cars & Investments, Inc., 332 Ga. App. at 826. Defendants are directed to supplement their 
responses accordingly with non-privileged, responsive information. 
(9) Plaintiffs' Requests for Admissions 
Plaintiffs contend Defendants' responses to their Request for Admissions ("RF A") Nos. 1-25 are 
evasive and deficient insofar as Defendants have objected to providing information regarding entities that 
are not a party to this litigation and excluded actions by employees of their wholly owned subsidiaries. In 
a supplemental response Defendants' have agreed to amend their responses to include TitleMax's non- 
party affiliates. Plaintiffs acknowledge the supplemental response moots their request to compel regarding 
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RFA Nos. 16-25 but urge Defendants' responses remain deficient as to RFA Nos. 1-15, which seek 
information concerning Defendants' alleged use of OMV records to identify and solicit Plaintiffs' 
customers. 
O.C.G.A. §9-11-36 governs requests for admissions. That Code Section provides in part: 
(a) Scope; service; answer or objection; motion to determine sufficiency. 
( 1) A party may serve upon any other party a written request for 
the admission, ... of the truth of any matters within the scope of subsection (b) of 
Code Section 9-11-26 which are set forth in the request and that relate to 
statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the 
genuineness of any documents described in the request. ... 
(2) Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set 
forth ... The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in detail the 
reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter. A 
denial shall fairly meet the substance of the requested admission; and, when 
good faith requires that a party qualify his answer or deny only a part of the 
matter of which an admission is requested, he shall specify so much of it as is 
true and qualify or deny the remainder. An answering party may not give 
lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny 
unless he states that he has made reasonable inquiry and that the 
information known or readily obtainable by him is insufficient to enable him 
to admit or deny. A party who considers that a matter of which an admission has 
been requested presents a genuine issue for trial may not, on that ground alone, 
object to the request; he may, subject to subsection (c) of Code Section 9-11-37, 
deny the matter or set forth reasons why he cannot admit or deny it. 
Here, Defendants' partial denials as to RF A Nos. 1-15 ( denying only that their employees or their 
affiliates' employees outside of Texas have conducted OMV searching) fail to comply with the 
requirements of O.C.G.A. §9-11-36 insofar as they do not "specify so much of [the admission] as is true 
and qualify or deny the remainder." Defendants are directed to supplement their responses accordingly to 
comply with O.C.G.A. §9-11-36. 
D. Defendants' request that Plaintiffs supplement their privilege log 
Defendants objected to Plaintiffs' privilege log, asserting it fails to provide the information 
necessary for Defendants to assess Plaintiffs' assertion of privilege. Specifically, Defendant cite: the 
failure to include the email addresses of the author, recipient, and carbon-copy recipients of each 
document; the failure to include the "subject line" of emails; the assertion of the attorney-client privilege 
and work produce doctrine as to each item listed on the log which is 83 pages in length and includes 
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2,624 documents; and Plaintiffs' failure to define a field/column heading included in the log (i.e. "DOC. 
GROUP BEGIN and DOC. GROUP END"). However, it appears Plaintiffs have amended their privilege 
log to address the issues raised by Defendants. Thus, the Court DENIES Defendants' request that 
Plaintiffs be deemed to have waived their privilege claims with respect to the documents identified in 
their privilege log. 
E. Defendants' request for additional interrogatories 
Defendants ask to be permitted an additional twenty-five (25) interrogatories beyond the fifty 
(50) allowed under the Civil Practice Act. O.C.G.A. §9-l 1-33(a)(l) generally limits the number of 
interrogatories a party may serve to fifty (50) interrogatories, including subparts. However, parties may 
with leave of court serve additional interrogatories upon a showing of, inter alia, complex litigation. Id. 
Here, given the number of parties and complexity of the claims asserted, the Court grants leave for the 
parties to serve an additional fifteen (15) interrogatories. 
F. Discovery related deadlines 
With the exception of the discovery requests regarding which the Court above has instructed the 
parties through their respective Counsel to meet and confer, any supplementation of discovery responses 
ordered herein should be provided to the opposing party within thirty (30) days of the entry of this order.44 
Further, in light of the Court's rulings herein, at the meet and confer conference ordered above 
Counsel are directed to also confer regarding case management deadlines and present a proposed 
amended case management order with deadlines that shall govern final adjudication of this action. 
V. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF PARAGRAPHS l(a) AND l(b) 
OF THE INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION 
On May 28, 2015, this Court entered a nationwide Interlocutory Injunction, enjoining Defendants 
from engaging in the following acts: (l)(a) searching state DMV records for the purpose of obtaining the 
identities and/or contact information of past or present customers of certain title loan stores operated by 
Plaintiffs and their affiliates for any purpose not allowed by the Driver's Privacy Protection Act 
44 The parties may stipulate to extend this time in light of the number of documents to be produced but must 
so notify the Court. 
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("DPPA"), 18 U.S.C. §2721, et seq.; (l)(b) using any information obtained from the OMV records to 
solicit Plaintiffs' customers; and (l)(c) entering Plaintiffs' stores or parking lots of their stores and 
(i) collecting or recording Plaintiffs' customers' license plate or vehicle identification numbers for any 
purposes not permitted by the DPPA, (ii) soliciting Plaintiffs' customers on Plaintiffs' premises, and 
(iii) offering money or compensation of any sort to employees of Plaintiffs' stores for referring any 
persons to do business with Defendants. 
On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed in part, reversed in part and 
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. With respect to the portion of the 
injunction predicated on the trespass claim, the Court held: "To the extent that the nationwide injunction 
limits the circumstances in which TitleMax may go upon property from which Drummond has no right to 
exclude TitleMax agents and employees, the scope of the injunction is not warranted by a claim for 
trespass ... " TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., LLC, 300 Ga. 835, 838, 797 S.E.2d 842, 
845 (2017). 
Regarding the portion of the injunction based on Plaintiffs' claim asserting a misappropriation of 
trade secrets under Georgia law, the Court held: "[T]o the extent that the nationwide injunction against 
TitleMax collecting information about Drummond customers in parking lots or using that information to 
search databases of motor vehicles is based on a finding that the identities of Drummond customers are 
trade secrets, the injunction cannot be sustained ... " Id. at 838-839. 
Finally, with regard to the portion of the injunction based on the claim for tortious interference 
with contracts and business relationships which prohibited TitleMax from offering compensation to 
Drummond employees who refer Drummond customers to TitleMax, the Court found no abuse of 
discretion in enjoining such conduct nationally. The Supreme Court concluded its opinion as follows: 
To the extent that the nationwide injunction prohibits TitleMax employees and 
agents from going into Drummond stores for certain purposes, and to the extent 
that it prohibits TitleMax from offering compensation to Drummond employees 
for customer referrals, the injunction is affirmed. To the extent that the 
injunction prohibits TitleMax from going upon parking lots near 
Drummond stores for certain purposes or from searching government 
databases of motor vehicles, however, it must be reconsidered. Those aspects 
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of the injunction appear most obviously to have been based on the claims for 
trespass and misappropriation of trade secrets, but the laws of trespass and trade 
secrets (at least in Georgia) do not support the scope of the injunction. 
Accordingly, we vacate the injunction in those respects, and we remand for 
the trial court to reconsider the scope of its injunction. To the extent that the 
parties on remand may rely on law that varies significantly from state to state, we 
remind that activities in one state are not due to be enjoined simply because 
they might be unlawful if done in another state. 
Id. at 839-40 (emphasis added). 
In the instant motion, Plaintiffs ask the Court to reinstate Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) of the 
nationwide Interlocutory Injunction ( collectively the "DMV Search and Solicitation Conduct"), because 
even if Defendants' conduct does not constitute a misappropriation of trade secrets under Georgia law, the 
DMV Search and Solicitation Conduct still constitutes: (1) tortious interference with contract and 
business relationships as alleged in Plaintiffs' complaint; and (2) a misappropriation of trade secrets under 
the laws of the other named States other than Georgia. 
A. Standard 
In deciding whether to issue an interlocutory injunction, the trial court should 
consider whether: (1) there is a substantial threat that the moving party will suffer 
irreparable injury if the injunction is not granted; (2) the threatened injury to the 
moving party outweighs the threatened harm that the injunction may do to the 
party being enjoined; (3) there is a substantial likelihood that the moving party 
will prevail on the merits of her claims at trial; and (4) granting the interlocutory 
injunction will not disserve the public interest. Bishop v. Patton, 288 Ga. at 604, 
706 S.E.2d 634.7 Although an interlocutory injunction is an extraordinary 
remedy, and the power to grant it must be" 'prudently and cautiously exercised,' 
" the trial court is vested with broad discretion in making that decision. Id. at 604, 
706 S.E.2d 634 (citation omitted). 
SRB Inv. Servs., LLLP v. Branch Banking & Tr. Co., 289 Ga. 1, 5, 709 S.E.2d 267,271 (2011). See also 
Parker v. Clary Lakes Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 272 Ga. 44, 44, 526 S.E.2d 838, 839 (2000) ("A trial court 
may issue an interlocutory injunction to maintain the status quo until the final hearing if, by balancing the 
relative equities of the parties, it would appear that the equities favor the party seeking the injunction. 
Thus, a demonstration of irreparable injury is not an absolute prerequisite to interlocutory injunctive 
relief'); City of Waycross v. Pierce Cty. Bd. of Commissioners, 300 Ga. I 09, 111, 793 S.E.2d 389, 392 
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(2016) ("Because the test for the issuance of an interlocutory injunction is a balancing test, it [i]s not 
incumbent upon the [moving party] to prove all four factors to obtain the interlocutory injunction"). 
B. Tortious interference with contract and business relationships 
Plaintiffs argue this Court already found Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their 
tortious interference claims, and on interlocutory appeal the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion 
in the Court's Interlocutory Injunction premised thereon. Given this, Plaintiffs contend the tortious 
interference claim affords an alternate ground supporting reinstatement of the injunction of the DMV 
Search and Solicitation Conduct. However, the appellate court actually found no abuse of discretion in the 
portions of the Interlocutory Injunction: that prohibited Defendants from offering compensation to 
Plaintiffs' employees for customer referrals, which the appellate court stated appeared to be based on the 
tortious interference claims"; and that prohibited Defendants' employees and agents from going into 
Plaintiffs' stores for "certain purposes", which was another aspect of Plaintiffs' tortious interference 
claims as alleged in their complaint". The Supreme Court did not address the DMV Search and 
Solicitation Conduct in the context of Plaintiffs' tortious interference claims. 
Further, as held in Part l(B)(2), supra, Count III (tortious interference with Plaintiffs' prospective 
CSO contracts and business relationships) is preempted entirely by Plaintiffs' trade secrets claims and the 
portion of Count IV (tortious interference with the Direct Lender Plaintiffs' prospective CSO contracts 
and business relationships) that relates to the alleged misappropriation of Plaintiffs' trade secrets 
(i.e., searching DMV records to obtain Plaintiffs' trade secret customer information to then solicit 
Plaintiffs' customers) is also preempted. The surviving portions of the tortious interference claim based 
on Defendants' improper solicitation of Plaintiffs' customers and employees on Plaintiffs' premises 
( which are in part the basis for other aspects of the Interlocutory Injunction which were upheld) provides 
no basis for the reinstatement of the portions of the Interlocutory Injunction addressing the DMV Search 






C. Misappropriation of trade secrets under the TSA of states other than Georgia 
As held in Part I(B)(l), Plaintiffs' trade secret misappropriation claims, which are construed 
under the laws of the state where such misappropriation is alleged to have occurred, survive the pleadings 
stage with the exception of the claim as asserted under Georgia law. As noted above, in Plaintiffs' 
pleadings and briefings the trade secrets claims and related allegations regarding the OMV Search and 
Solicitation Conduct focus on such conduct as is alleged to have occurred in Ohio and New Mexico.47 
Having balanced the relative equities of the parties, the Court finds the equities weigh in favor of 
Plaintiffs and the reinstatement of the Interlocutory Injunction with respect to the OMV Search and 
Solicitation Conduct but only in Ohio and New Mexico. Plaintiffs have presented evidence that they 
safeguard their customers' information (including names, contact information, and lien information), that 
this information is not readily available to the public and that Plaintiffs derive economic value from the 
compiled information not being readily ascertainable through proper means by others, and that in Ohio 
and New Mexico Defendants are likely improperly accessing OMV record information in order to directly 
solicit Plaintiffs' customers. 
The Court further finds there is a substantial threat that Plaintiffs will suffer irreparable injury if 
the injunction is not granted with respect to the OMV Search and Solicitation Conduct in the loss of, inter 
alia, long-time customers and goodwill. Also, the threatened injury to Plaintiffs outweighs any threatened 
harm that the injunction may do to Defendants, particularly given that Defendants cannot assert any right 
to do that which is unlawful or any harm from following the law regarding the proper use of OMV record 
information. Further, reinstating the injunction as to the OMV Search and Solicitation Conduct will not 
disserve the public interest, but rather serves the public interest in protecting consumers' private 
information and ensuring state and federal laws governing the use of OMV record information are 
followed. 
47 See F AC, ,i,i68, 90-92; Plaintiffs' Motion for Interlocutory Injunction and for Litigation Expenses, pp. 23- 
24, 29-31; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, pp. 10-11, 13-18 and nn. 9, 10, 15, 
16; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendants' Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, p.8. 
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Although Plaintiffs urge the injunction regarding the OMV Search and Solicitation Conduct 
should be reinstated nationwide, as noted by the Supreme Court : 
[I]f Drummond has shown only that TitleMax may have misappropriated trade 
secrets in one or two states by improperly gathering information in those states 
about customers in those states, we fail to see how that showing would sustain 
a nationwide injunction against TitleMax gathering customer information, 
including in states in which its practices may not violate the law of trade secrets 
in any respect (like Georgia). 
TMX Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Fin. Servs., 300 Ga. at 839 n. 8 (emphasis in original). 
Here, evidence has been presented regarding Defendants' alleged OMV Search and Solicitation 
Conduct in Ohio and New Mexico.48 Although Plaintiffs allege "upon information and belief' that such 
conduct is taking place elsewhere and is actionable, that is an insufficient showing to warrant a 
nationwide injunction. Id. Given the foregoing, Plaintiffs' Motion for Reinstatement of Paragraphs l(a) 
and l(b) of the Interlocutory Injunction is GRANTED IN PART and Paragraphs l(a) and l(b) are hereby 
reinstated but only to the extent of enjoining Defendants from engaging in the activities described 
thereunder in Ohio and New Mexico. 
VI. PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SEPARATE TRIAL ON DEFENDANTS' 
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS 
In the instant motion Plaintiffs' ask the Court to order that Defendants' counterclaims be tried 
separately from Plaintiffs' claims pursuant to O.C.G.A. §9-11-13(b). That Code Section provides in 
relevant part: "A pleading may state as a counterclaim any claim against an opposing party not arising out 
of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. But any such 
permissive counterclaim shall be separated for the purposes of trial, unless the parties otherwise agree." 
Having considered the record, the Court will reserve ruling on this motion pending completion of 
discovery, resolution of any dispositive motions and until closer to trial. 
48 Excluding Texas and South Carolina. 
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SO ORDERED this qay of March, 2018. 
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